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Does Unconventional Gas Require Unconventional Ownership? 
An Analysis of the Functionality of Ownership Frameworks for 
Unconventional Gas Development 
Samantha Hepburn* 
ABSTRACT 
The implementation of a responsive and coherent property framework, 
capable of effectively supporting the progression of a rapidly expanding 
unconventional gas industry is proving to be a complex and intricate process 
for many countries.1 The theory of mineral ownership that underpins any 
regulatory framework represents its point of departure.2 It is increasingly 
                                                             
* Professor, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University Australia. 
1 Some of the problems experienced in the United States are outlined by 
Mikal C. Watts & Emily C. Jeffcott, Does He Who Owns the Minerals Own 
the Shale Gas? A Guide to Shale Mineral Classification, 8 TEX. J. OIL, GAS 
& ENERGY L. 27, 36 (2013) (the authors explain the different ways in which 
states have attempted to maneuver around ownership restrictions). See also 
Sarah Kathryn Farnell, Methane Gas Ownership: A Proposed Solution for 
Alabama, 33 ALA. L. REV. 521 (1982) (where the author concludes that the 
major barrier to the commercial production of coal bed methane has been the 
failure of the legal system to adequately resolve conflicting claims of 
ownership). 
2 The principles underpinning mineral ownership inform and facilitate 
the structure of the regulatory framework. See Nicholas J. Campbell Jr., 
Principles of Mineral Ownership in the Civil Law and Common Law System, 
31 TUL. L. REV. 303, 304 (1956–1957) (arguing that the theoretical study of 
the ownership of minerals belongs to natural law, whilst the study of legal 
norms for their exploitation belongs to administrative, public and commercial 
law). 
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clear that the problems associated with the expansion of unconventional gas 
development have challenged both private and state-based models.3 This 
article examines how the core principles that form the foundation for land 
and mineral ownership in both the United States and Australia have 
responded to the rapid expansion of the unconventional gas industry. The 
conventional inertia associated with institutionalized property frameworks 
has meant that the frameworks are largely resistant to external change.4 
Hence, whilst the transformation that has occurred in the energy industries 
following the advent of unconventional gas development has been 
remarkable,5 ownership frameworks have struggled to cope.6 Many 
principles that evolved in a period when unconventional gas was 
inconceivable are now proving ill-equipped and non-responsive to the new 
energy environment. This Article argues that the stasis that afflicts ownership 
frameworks has precluded many of the conventional principles from adapting 
to meet the needs of this new energy revolution. This has generated an 
increasing imperative, in both the United States and Australia, to develop and 
                                                             
3 See Jeff L. Lewin, Hema J. Siriwardane, Samuel J. Ameri & Syd S. 
Peng, Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or Legislative 
Determination of the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 563 
(1992) (where the authors argue that in the United States, the common law 
ownership principles relating to coal bed methane involve greater complexity 
than legislative initiatives). 
4 See generally Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Property, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1163, 1166 (1999) (where the author argues that in well-functioning 
property regimes, legislatures and courts draw internal boundaries that 
constrain excessive fragmentation and keep resources well-scaled for 
productive use). 
5 See Ross H. Pifer, A Greener Shade of Blue?: The Technology and 
Shale Revolution, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 131, 134 
(2013) (arguing that the use of shale will be primarily responsible for re-
shaping the United States energy economy). 
6 See Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 803, 836 (2013) (where the author argues that new ownership 
strategies and policies are required for energy innovation). 
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implement legislative initiatives that revise or alter the way in which the 
schema of orthodox ownership principles applies to unconventional gas.7 
Focused legislative development will promote adaptable, consistent, and 
structured principles, which in turn will allow ownership frameworks to 
respond to the operational demands of a new energy era.8 
  
                                                             
7 See also Shelley Ross Saxer & Carol M. Rose, A Prospective Look at 
Property Rights, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 721, 723 (2013). See also Rule, 
supra note 6, at 805 (arguing that the use of statute based, liability rules 
rather than property rules may help to balance new energy entitlements with 
existing property entitlements). See also Farnell, supra note 1, at 532 (noting 
that legislative determination of ownership would alleviate problems of 
uncertainty which would, in turn, facilitate production and utilization). 
8 See Ronald K. Olson, Coalbed Methane: Legal Considerations 
Affecting Its Development as an Energy Resource, 13 TULSA L.J. 377, 382–
83 (1978). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, where land and minerals are sourced in a private 
ownership framework, many of the common law principles that have evolved 
to support the control and possession of natural gas have experienced 
difficulties adjusting to the rapid expansion of unconventional gas.9 This has 
produced some complicated outcomes. For example, in some states, courts 
have sought to draw fine distinctions between different forms of 
unconventional gas and to apply different ownership principles on the basis 
of this distinction. 
In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court expanded core ownership principles 
to allow the owner of coal to claim possession and ownership over any coal 
bed methane residing within the coal.10 Until recently, however, there had 
been limited discussion as to whether this principle could also be extended to 
shale gas. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently considered this issue 
and sought to distinguish shale gas from coal bed methane by holding that 
shale gas constituted natural gas and coal bed methane did not.11 The effect of 
this distinction was that the owner of the shale was unable to assert ownership 
rights over any shale gas residing within that shale in the same way that the 
owner of coal had been able to assert ownership over the coal bed methane 
residing in the coal. 
                                                             
9 Id. at 385–90 (where the author argues that the applicability of many of 
the ownership theories for fugacious minerals depends upon the 
characterization of unconventional gas as natural gas and this is debatable in 
the context of coal bed methane). 
10 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (where 
the court concluded that "[A]s a general rule, subterranean gas is owned by 
whoever has title to the property in which the gas is resting"). 
11 See Butler v. Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, WL 1749828 (Pa. 
Apr. 24, 2013) where the court evaluated the nature of "natural gas" and 
"shale natural gas." 
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Improvised distinctions between the characteristics of coal bed methane 
and those of shale gas have contributed to a deepening schism between the 
way in which ownership principles apply to conventional minerals as 
opposed to unconventional gas. These categorisations have generated 
inexorable problems for the progression of the industry because it is unclear 
which conventional ownership rules will apply to which form of 
unconventional gas. These problems have highlighted the need for broad 
based legislative intervention. The new energy landscape needs to be 
supported by a comprehensive and consistent ownership framework that is 
responsive to existing social, environmental and technological developments. 
These concerns should not be eclipsed by obsolete and compartmentalised 
property rules.12 
In Australia, where mineral ownership resides with the state, the 
exploitation of unconventional gas has generated considerable landowner 
antagonism, prompting a fundamental re-evaluation of the core division 
between surface and mineral ownership.13 The legislature has responded by 
introducing greater regulatory protections for landowners.14 These initiatives 
have, however, created dense, multi-layered review processes and complex 
jurisdictional variations that have thwarted industry progression and 
increased community unease. This has exacerbated the need for further 
                                                             
12 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 837, 842 (2013) (arguing that antiquated common law principles 
often overshadow foreground issues relating to property, safety and the 
environment). 
13 See Susan Johnston, Whose Right—The Adequacy of the Law 
Governing CSG Development in Queensland, 20 AUSTRALIAN MINING & 
PETROLEUM L.J. 259, 262 (2001) (where the author considers the expansion 
of regulatory conflicts that have emerged in Australia due to the granting of 
overlapping exploration and production titles and the creation of intersecting 
ownership interests). 
14 See, e.g., Code of Practice for Coal Seam Gas Well Integrity 2012 
(NSW) (Austl.), Aquifer Interference Policy 2012 (NSW) (Austl.). 
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deliberation on how to improve the involvement of landowners in resource 
exploitation and resource conflict processes.15 
The absence of an overarching ownership taxonomy for unconventional 
gas in both Australia and the United States is derived from the fact that, 
whilst coal bed methane, shale and tight gas are all widely recognized today, 
in previous decades they were not regarded as commercially viable because 
the technology to extract them did not exist.16 The relatively recent 
development of extraction technology, particularly for shale gas, which has a 
much lower permeability than natural gas, has revolutionized the industry.17 
The legal response to this technological revolution has been sporadic and 
disjointed. Jurisprudence across different states in America has evolved in an 
extemporized and individualistic manner that has generated significant 
conflict and uncertainty between different land and mineral interest holders.18 
This Article argues that the effective progression of the unconventional 
gas industry in both the United States and Australia depends upon the 
                                                             
15 One such initiative is the Land Access Code introduced in Queensland 
which seeks to promote consistent behavioral standards for CSG operators 
when exercising access entitlements. 
16 See Pifer, supra note 5, at 134 (where the author notes that "the Shale 
Revolution has been unleashed not because of a geologic discovery, but 
rather because extraction technology finally has developed to the point where 
economical extraction of long-known resources has become possible"). 
17 For a detailed outline of the nature of shale gas see, e.g., HOWARD R. 
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 700 
(14th ed. 2009). 
18 See Saxer & Rose, supra note 7, at 724 ("We must use common law 
and legislation in focused ways, to promote concepts of ownership that 
encourage investment, innovation and prudent uses of resources"). See also 
Jason P. Webb, Pennsylvania & Coalbed Methane: Reviving the Traditional 
Willingness to Protect Surface Owners, TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 35 
(2008) (where the author outlines the diversity of opinion in the cases that 
have emerged in Pennsylvania). 
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introduction of new and innovative approaches to conventional ownership 
assumptions. This is a challenging task for both private and state-based 
ownership frameworks given their predilection for constancy.19 Deeper and 
more informed consideration must therefore be given to the utility of targeted 
legislative intervention and its capacity to provide greater clarity and 
direction. 
This Article explores the different common law principles that regulate 
land and mineral ownership in the United States. It evaluates some of the 
responses that have emerged to the development of unconventional gas 
interests and considers the scope and ongoing utility of these developments. 
The Article goes on to examine the state or "dominial" mineral ownership 
framework that exists in Australia. It considers the utility of the state 
ownership model following the rapid expansion of unconventional gas and 
examines some of the difficulties that have emerged in this context. 
Part I of the Article outlines the core principles that inform land and 
mineral ownership within the United States. Consideration is given to the rule 
of capture, the doctrine of severance, whereby mineral estates are severed 
from land ownership, the rules of construction that support the interpretation 
of mineral deeds and the way in which these principles have been applied 
pursuant to the ownership and non-ownership theories. The response of these 
fundamental common law principles to the expansion of unconventional gas 
is examined and the overall ability of the rules to adapt to emergent concerns 
is scrutinized. 
Part II of the Article comprehensively evaluates the state framework for 
mineral ownership in Australia. It considers the nature and scope of statutory 
mineral ownership, the interface between public mineral ownership and 
private land ownership and the impact of the dramatic expansion of 
unconventional gas, particularly in the eastern states, upon this framework. It 
                                                             
19 See generally Francis Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property 
Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938) (for a broader discussion on the 
difficulties associated with adapting established property concepts to new 
circumstances). 
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also considers the utility of some of the legislative responses to 
unconventional gas development that have been introduced to date. 
Part III examines possible options for reform in both the United States 
and Australia. In this Part it is argued that both the courts and the legislatures 
need to adopt a more engaged and collaborative approach to resolving the 
ownership concerns underpinning unconventional gas expansion. Legislative 
initiatives are urgently required, particularly in circumstances where existing 
common law ownership principles are no longer functional or cogent. 
Whether the ownership framework is private or state based in nature, an 
engaged and reactive approach to the ownership questions relevant to 
unconventional gas development is vital. 
Unconventional gas has emerged as a crucial component of global 
energy production.20 This valuable new energy market needs to be properly 
supported by reliable, coherent and justifiable ownership models that 
adequately support the demands of a new energy era. Conventional 
ownership principles that relate to a different epoch and pre-date the 
technological advancements connected with unconventional gas exploitation 
may ultimately prove incapable of adapting efficiently to this pivotal shift in 
energy modernism. 
II. LAND AND MINERAL OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. THE AD COELUM MAXIM 
The framework for land and mineral ownership in the United States 
stems from the fundamental common law maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est 
usque ad coelum et ad inferos meaning whoever owns the soil also owns up 
                                                             
20 In the United States alone it is estimated that by 2035, shale gas will 
comprise more than half of all domestic production. See U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2013, Early Release Overview, DOE/EIA-
0383ER (2013) at 2, 15 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ 
aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2013).pdf. 
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to the sky and down to the depths.21 The rule functions as a core tenet of 
common law land and mineral ownership.22 Whilst the maxim has been 
described as a "fanciful phrase" and an "outworn medievalism" land 
ownership in the United States continues to bear the "ineradicable marks" of 
its application.23 
The maxim focuses on the scope of surface estate ownership. The 
infinite range of the maxim has been qualified by particularized statutory 
provisions. In most states, however, the maxim continues to function as the 
primary legal foundation for surface estate ownership over static, in situ sub-
surface minerals such as coal.24 
The ad coelum principle is premised upon the fundamental assumption 
that the surface estate owner retains rights to minerals in the sub-surface 
strata on the grounds of corporeal proximity. The minerals reside in the soil 
that constitutes the physicality of land and therefore ownership of the land 
necessarily constitutes ownership of the minerals. As outlined by William 
Blackstone, "downwards, whatever is in a direct line, between the surface of 
any land and the center of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface."25 
                                                             
21 See generally John Sprankling, Owning the Centre of the Earth, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 979, 1000–01 (2008) (discussing the scope of the ad coelum 
doctrine as it applies to the sub-strata). 
22 See Stuart S. Ball, The Jural Nature of Land, 23 ILL. L. REV. 45, 48 
(1928). 
23 For a detailed discussion on the nature and scope of the modern 
application of the ad coelum principle see generally Owen L. Anderson, Lord 
Coke, the Restatement and Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 TEX. J. OIL, 
GAS & ENERGY J. 203 (2011). 
24 See id. at 206. 
25 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND—1969, Book 2, at 17. 
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The continuity of this maxim has been crucial for the evolution of the 
ownership framework in the United States as it justifies the integration of 
land and mineral ownership and gives the surface estate owner control over in 
situ sub-surface minerals.26 In this respect, the ad coelum principle invests the 
surface estate owner with the capacity to sever the sub-surface minerals from 
the surface estate and create a separate mineral estate.27 
The transitory nature of oil and gas, including unconventional gas, has 
meant, however, that the maxim provides little ownership guidance for these 
minerals. Oil, gas and water whether alone or in combination may be found in 
a variety of different geological formations. Where oil and gas is trapped by 
the pressure of the earth it will not move, but after having drilled into an oil 
well, the reservoir of oil, gas and water loses its equilibrium and begins to 
move in the permeable rocks that contain them.28 
A change in the naturally imposed pressure activates the migratory 
capacity of oil, gas and water as they move towards the drill. The migratory 
nature of oil and gas has meant that these minerals have been subjected to 
different ownership principles, which are activated when the minerals have 
                                                             
26 See generally Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy 
Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA L.J. 311 (1993); see also Colleen E. Lamarre, 
Owning the Centre of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and the Subsurface 
Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 
462 (2011). 
27 EUGENE O. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.1, 
at 83 (1987) (discussing the landowners ability to sever his mineral estate 
from the surface estate). 
28 See Harry Cohen, Property Theories Affecting the Landowner in a 
New Oil and Gas Producing State, 10 ALA. L. REV. 323, 326 (1958). 
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been physically controlled.29 It is not possible to determine the ownership of 
migratory minerals purely on the basis of surface estate ownership.30 
B. THE RULE OF CAPTURE 
In the United States, the ownership of natural gas is amenable to the 
common law principle known as the rule of capture.31 The fugacious 
character of gas means that it needs to be controlled before ownership may be 
asserted.32 The rule of capture is the fundamental ownership principle on 
which the entire framework for oil and gas law is constructed in the United 
States.33 It has been judicially recognized since 188634 and continues to have 
an application to oil and gas, including coal bed methane, despite being 
                                                             
29 See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture: An 
Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 935–36 (2005). 
30 See Lamarre, supra note 26, at 463 ("State adoption of policies 
encouraging commercial oil and gas production drove courts to interpret laws 
in favour of production and to limit landowners' individual property rights"). 
31 This has been confirmed in the seminal decision of Westmoreland & 
Cambria Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724 (1889) (where the court noted that 
"Possession of the land . . . is not necessarily possession of the gas"). 
32 See GEORGE BRYAN, THE LAW OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS 
§ 43 (1898) (describing gas as a mineral ferae naturae); see generally D. 
Goble, Commons, Capture, the Public Trust and Property in Land, 35 
ENVTL. L. 807, 813 (2005) (where the author notes that the rule of capture 
applied to allow wild animals to be owned once captured, possessed and 
controlled). 
33 See Farnell, supra note 1; see also Lewin, Siriwardane, Ameri & 
Peng, supra note 3, at 563 (where the authors outline a range of potential 
ownership options for CBM if it is not characterized as a component of coal); 
see also W. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YALE L.J. 174 (1919) (for 
the impact of the rule of capture as an ownership principle). 
34 See generally Wood Cnty. Petroleum Co. v. W. Va. Transp. Co., 28 
W. Va. 210 (W. Va. 1886). 
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described, one the one hand, "as the most important single doctrine of oil and 
gas law" and on the other, as "absurd," and "almost idiotic."35 
In its application to gas, the rule of capture allows a landowner who has 
induced the gas to his possession to claim the gas even though it may have 
formerly been deposited under another's land. Once captured, the holder will 
retain full common law ownership of the gas subject only to public policy 
obligations and regulatory restrictions.36 
In substance, the rule of capture restricts the liability of landowners in 
circumstances where they have depleted reservoirs that extend across their 
property lines. As outlined by the court in Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 
The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and 
gas that he produces from wells on his land, though part 
of the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoining lands. 
He may thus appropriate the oil and gas that have flowed 
from adjacent lands without the consent of the owner of 
those lands, and without incurring liability to him for 
drainage.37 
In its early days, the rule resulted in an extraordinary wastage of oil and 
gas resources because landowners would lease oil rights to lessees who would 
then rush to drill and exploit the high natural reservoir pressures that would 
                                                             
35 See ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF 
OIL AND GAS § 1.1(A) (2d ed. 1998) ("The rule of capture may be the most 
important single doctrine of oil and gas law"); see generally AILEEN 
MCHARG, BARRY BARTON, ADRIAN BRADBROOK & LEE GODDEN, 
PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 140 (2010); 
see generally JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES OIL POLICY 217 (1926) 
(referencing to the "absurd and idiotic"). 
36 Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 341 (1893). 
37 Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561–62 (Tex. 1948). 
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drive the oil and gas to the surface.38 The unmitigated application of the rule 
of capture eventually prompted the emergence of a body of correlative rights, 
to limit and qualify the application of the rule and take account of emergent 
conservation principles.39 The current correlative rights doctrine may be 
summarized as follows: (1) the owner only has the right to capture the natural 
flow of gas; (2) only reasonable means may be used to capture flowing gas 
and conservation rules may not be breached; (3) there must be no injury 
caused to the common source of supply; and (4) the common source of 
supply must not be destroyed through intentional or negligent behaviour.40 
The rule of capture has also been qualified by unitization initiatives 
which amount to the joint, coordinated operation of an oil or gas reservoir by 
all the owners of rights in the separate tracts overlying the reservoir or 
reservoirs.41 Unitization protects correlative rights because it gives all owners 
of the common reservoir a fair share of production. Voluntary unitization has 
always been difficult to achieve; today, however, most states apart from 
Texas have introduced some form of compulsory unitization legislation.42 
Finally, an overriding qualification to the rule of capture lies in the capacity 
of legislation to alter or restrict the scope and application of the rule.43 
                                                             
38 See SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 35. 
39 G.D. Libecap & J.L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum 
Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S592 (2002). 
40 Kramer & Anderson, supra note 29, at 916. 
41 Jacqueline L. Weaver & David F. Asmus, Unitizing Oil and Gas 
Fields Around the World: A Comparative Analysis of National Law and 
Private Contracts, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3, 11 (2006). 
42 2 ROBERT BRADLEY JR., OIL, GAS AND GOVERNMENT: THE U.S. 
EXPERIENCE 200–02 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1996). 
43 See Kramer & Anderson, supra note 29, at 903. 
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The rule of capture has been analogized with ferae naturae, the 
ownership principle that governs wild animals.44 It has, however, been 
suggested that this analogy is forced because wild animals are public property 
and everyone has an equal right to possession and ownership of them, 
whereas the oil and gas that exists beneath private land is private property, 
meaning that the landowner retains exclusive ownership of the right to 
capture these resources.45 
In states where the ownership in place theory is upheld, natural gas that 
exists in situ will continue to belong to the surface estate owner or, in the 
context of unconventional gas, may be found belong to the owner of the coal 
or, presumably, the shale.46 The fact that the gas has the capacity to migrate 
does not mean that the scope of surface or mineral estate ownership is 
automatically diminished. As outlined in Texas Co. v. Daugherty:  
If these minerals are a part of the realty while in place, as 
undoubtedly they are, upon what principle can the 
ownership of the property interest, which they constitute 
while they are beneath or within the land, be other than 
the ownership of an interest in the realty?47 
The prima facie claim of a surface estate owner to sub-surface in situ 
gas does not preclude the right of an adjoining landowner to exercise a lawful 
right to capture the gas in its migratory state. As has been outlined by 
Professor Kuntz, land boundaries are not inviolate, and the cost and effort 
                                                             
44 Rance L. Craft, Of Reservoir Hogs and Pelt Fiction: Defending the 
Ferae Naturae Analogy between Petroleum and Wildlife, 44 EMORY L.J. 697 
(1995). 
45 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 720 (Tex. 1915). 
46 Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 1, at 36 (in reviewing the different 
principles applicable to shale gas ownership, the authors predict that 
Kentucky courts would apply the same principles to shale gas as they have to 
coal bed methane). 
47 Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 720. 
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associated with gas extraction justifies upholding the rule of capture for 
migrating gas.48 
In this respect it is important to distinguish oil and gas from other static 
minerals. Gas, in particular, has "the power and the tendency to escape 
without the volition of the owner."49 The fugitive nature of the resource 
necessarily means that in situ ownership can only continue for as long as the 
gas remains on or in that land.50 
Despite its origins, when applied to oil and gas, the rule of capture 
amounts to an ownership principle that is inherently connected with land 
because it permits landowners to claim any oil and gas they have captured via 
vertical wells on their land. This means that the owner of a tract of land 
acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled on that 
land despite the fact that, "it may be proven that part of such oil and gas 
migrated from adjoining lands."51 In this respect, where no specific gas lease 
has been issued, surface estate owners holding land which is reasonably 
proximate to the common source are best positioned to exercise the rule of 
capture.52 
                                                             
48 Eugene Kuntz, The Rule of Capture, 10 OKLA. L. REV. 406, 407 
(1957). 
49 Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 
(Pa. 1889). 
50 Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 
1889). 
51 Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and its Implications as 
Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935). 
52 Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 
38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 405 (1995) (arguing that the rule of capture has the 
capacity to create classic open access dissipation however, where common 
property applies (which is an intermediary between open access and private 
property), dissipation is reduced). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 16 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.62 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 8 Issue 1 
Winter 2013 
It has been held that the rule of capture should be extended to apply to 
coal bed methane gas that is trapped within a coal bed. In Continental Res. of 
Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Methane, L.L.C., the Illinois Court of Appeal concluded: 
Under the rule of capture, gas that migrates from one 
property to another is subject to recovery and possession 
by the holder of the gas estate on the property to which 
the gas migrates. Because coalbed is similar to and 
migrates in the same manner as other natural gas, there is 
no reason that the rule of capture and the laws governing 
the ownership of migratory natural gas should not apply 
to coalbed methane as well.53 
The issue in this context is whether the owner of the coal retains the 
right to capture the coal bed methane residing within that coal or whether that 
right is exercisable by adjacent landowners. In Bowles v. Hopkins Cnty. Col., 
L.L.C. the Kentucky Court of Appeal held that the owner of coal retained a 
right to capture the coal bed methane. This right was, however, qualified by 
the Bowles court which held that once the methane had escaped, the right of 
capture was automatically transferrable to other adjacent land owners.54 The 
court stated: 
. . . the owners of the coal estate may produce the CBM 
while it is present in the coal seam or vein, but that it is 
subject to capture by the owner of the mineral estate in 
the event that it should migrate from the coal seam or 
vein.55 
                                                             
53 Con't Res. of Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Methane, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 897, 
901 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (courts have not yet extended this principle to shale 
but presumably a similar rationale would apply). 
54 Bowles v. Hopkins Cnty. Coal, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
55 Heller, supra note 4, at 1165. 
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The decisions that have extended the rule of capture to coal bed methane 
assume the threshold classification of methane as a natural gas.56 There is 
support for this categorisation because methane has been described as the 
"lightest and most abundant" of the many hydrocarbons that make up natural 
gas.57 The fact that coal bed methane may be captured and possessed also 
makes it akin to natural gas. 
In those states where the non-ownership principle is upheld, until natural 
or unconventional gas is "captured" and possessed, it will not be subject to 
ownership.58 States upholding the non-ownership principle have held that a 
right to capture natural gas, including coal bed methane, confers upon the 
holder an incorporeal interest in the form of a profit a préndre which gives 
the holder an exclusive right to explore and develop the property so as to 
reduce methane to possession.59 
The right to capture shale gas would also seem to come within the scope 
of this right given the migratory status of shale gas.60 This issue was explored 
in the recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Butler v. Charles 
Powers Estate. In that case the court distinguished coal bed methane from 
                                                             
56 Olson, supra note 8, at 385 ("the tendency of coal bed methane to 
migrate through coal and porous rock to areas of reduced pressure or to 
exposed surfaces which make the ferae naturae analogy particularly 
appropriate"). 
57 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 17, at 261. 
58 Hardwicke, supra note 51, at 395. 
59 Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 479 U.S. 925, 962 (1986) (quoting 
the Louisiana Supreme Court that "Ownership of land does not include 
ownership of oil, gas and other minerals, occurring naturally in liquid or 
gaseous form" but that the "landowner has the exclusive right to explore and 
develop his property for the production of such minerals and reduce them to 
possession and ownership"). 
60 See generally Bernard D. Goldstein, Elizabeth F. Bjerke & Jill 
Kriesky, Challenges of Unconventional Shale Gas Development: So What's 
the Rush?, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 149 (2013). 
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other forms of natural gas, such as shale gas.61 The court opined that the 
genesis for this distinction lay in its earlier decision in U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Hoge where coal bed methane was not treated as a natural gas but rather a 
dangerous gas that coal owners should be entitled to ventilate. The court ruled 
in Butler that, in contrast to coal bed methane, shale gas was a natural gas and 
the fact that hydro-fracking technology is required to extract it does not alter 
this status.62 As a form of natural gas, shale gas comes within the application 
of the rule of capture and, therefore, within the scope of the profit a préndre 
entitlement. 
By contrast, the Butler court suggests that coal bed methane may now be 
outside the scope of the rule of capture, at least in a non-ownership state such 
as Pennsylvania because it does not constitute a natural gas. The complexity 
of this distinction, and its implications for the application of ownership rights 
to different forms of unconventional gas highlights some of the fundamental 
concerns associated with the adaption of orthodox property rules. 
A further, more fundamental concern connected with the exercise of the 
rule of capture over shale gas lies in the fact that the hydro-fracturing 
technology which is utilized to extract shale gas has the potential to generate 
"trespass" liability where it extends into adjoining sub-surface strata. It has 
been argued that sub-surface entry into a neighbouring gas formation, for the 
purpose of capture, could potentially result in liability on the basis of 
trespass, conversion, nuisance or negligence.63 
                                                             
61 Butler v. Charles Power Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 896–97 
(Pa. 2013). 
62 Id. 
63 Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface 
Trespass, 28 TULSA L.J. 311, 316 (1993); see also Aaron Stemplewicz, The 
Known Unknowns of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Case for a Traditional 
Subsurface Trespass Regime in Pennsylvania, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219, 227 
(2011) (arguing that legal questions remain as to the exact extent to which the 
rule of capture modifies common law trespass in the context of hydraulic 
fracturing activities). 
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In those states where the non-ownership principle has been adopted, it 
has been argued that the capture of shale gas through fracture stimulation 
comes within the scope of the profit a préndre right and will, therefore, not 
generate a trespass claim where the only injury asserted involves the drainage 
of hydrocarbons.64 
This approach was confirmed in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp v. Garza 
Energy Trust, where the court concluded that the rule of capture gives a 
mineral rights owner title to the oil and gas produced from a lawful well, 
bottomed on the property, even if the oil and gas flowed to the well from 
beneath another owners tract. According to this interpretation, the rule of 
capture is broad enough to preclude any recovery of damages for a drainage 
resulting from a fracture stimulation crossing property lines. 
Significantly, the court in Coastal Oil did not expressly decide whether 
a fracture stimulation that crossed property lines would actually constitute a 
trespass. Instead, the court made it clear that historically in Texas the Railway 
Commission was responsible for regulating the rule of capture and this 
function should not be allowed to be usurped by trespass principles. The court 
concluded that without the rule of capture, "drainage would amount to a 
taking of a mineral owner's property—the oil and gas below the surface of the 
property—thereby limiting the Commission's power to regulate production to 
assure a fair recovery by each owner."65 
The re-articulation of the rule of capture to preclude damages for sub-
surface trespass has resulted in the expansion of a fundamental common law 
property principle to meet the demands of new hydraulic fracturing 
techniques. Arguably, this expansion distorts the core objective of the rule of 
capture which originated as an efficiency principle, limiting liability in 
circumstances where fugacious minerals which were possessed and 
controlled had been diverted from adjoining land. 
                                                             
64 See generally Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
65 Id. 
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The proprietary foundation of the rule of capture should not mean that 
all exploration activities necessarily avoid surface estate liability.66 Shale gas 
extracted via hydraulic fracturing techniques should continue to be cognizant 
of the entitlements of surface estate owners to sub-surface strata. The ad 
coelum principle mandates the extension of surface ownership into the sub-
surface strata. The relationship between ad coelum and the rule of capture has 
been described as a "grand inconsistency."67 Where sub-surface ownership 
rights are violated by extraction techniques exercised in accordance with the 
rule of capture, a collision between corporeal and incorporeal ownership 
ensues. The profit a préndre interest generated by the rule of capture disturbs 
the ad coelum entitlements of the surface estate owner and greater clarity 
regarding boundary violations becomes imperative.68 
In the past, such ownership violations have been largely moderated by 
the correlative rights doctrine.69 A state that upholds the correlative rights of 
owners over a common reservoir must necessarily mitigate against a strict 
application of the rule of capture in favour of giving each owner a 
"reasonable opportunity to produce his proportionate part of the oil and gas 
from the entire pool and to prevent operating practices injurious to the 
                                                             
66 See Theresa D. Poindexter, Note, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the 
Rule of Capture Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic 
Fracturing Cases, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 755 (2009) for a discussion of surface 
estate liability. 
67 See David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern 
Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 10 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 248 (2011) (describing the relationship between the ad 
coelum principle and the rule of capture in this context as a grand 
inconsistency"). 
68 See KUNTZ, supra note 27, § 4.3, 120 (arguing that the conduct of 
owners must be qualified by the particular conditions of this special 
community). 
69 See Poindexter, supra note 66, at 758. 
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common reservoir."70 The correlative rights doctrine, therefore, upholds the 
right of each landowner to take oil and gas on his land through lawful 
operations and the privilege may not be exercised in an injurious manner.71 
A determination of what is and what is not consistent with the 
correlative rights doctrine will depend upon whether the activity is deemed 
socially acceptable under the circumstances.72 In this respect, the correlative 
rights doctrine has been found to preclude rights against waste, spoilage and 
malicious damage and, arguably, may be the most appropriate common law 
principle to evaluate whether sub-surface incursions resulting from hydraulic 
fracturing operations constitute a trespass.73 
Longer term, however, it has become increasingly imperative to ensure 
that common law ownership principles are responsive to the physical 
environment in which unconventional gas interests exist. Orthodox ownership 
concepts premised upon the notion of absolute exclusivity are increasingly 
inappropriate in the context of multiple, overlapping sub-surface rights in oil 
and gas. These issues have been exacerbated following the expansion of 
unconventional gas interests because the multiplicity of rights has 
significantly increased the potential for sub-surface conflict and incursion.74 
Allowing a landowner to assert formal, tort based rights in the context of 
unconventional gas expansion has the potential to significantly increase the 
liability of gas licensees. Arguably, a preferable approach is to treat the 
                                                             
70 Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948). 
71 Id. 
72 KUNTZ, supra note 27, § 4.3, at 120. 
73 See Poindexter, supra note 66, at 781 (arguing that the court must use 
the doctrine of correlative rights to cases involving hydraulic fracturing that 
cross property lines because it is a more appropriate principle to utilize when 
evaluating complex reciprocal property rights of landowners over a common 
reservoir). 
74 See Poindexter, supra note 66. 
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ownership interests arising in the sub-surface strata as "limited common 
property," held as "commons" among the members of the group or, in the 
case of oil and gas, the "special ownership community."75 This approach 
would allow each owner within the group to make "acceptable uses" of the 
reservoir in order to extract oil and gas.76 It would also preclude owners 
within the group from conducting "unreasonable" and therefore 
"unacceptable" uses of their common property interests. This type of 
ownership recalibration is likely to work more effectively for unconventional 
gas interests as it would encourage reciprocal interaction. 
C. SEVERANCE OF THE MINERAL ESTATE FROM THE SURFACE 
ESTATE 
A central tenet in the taxonomy of land and mineral ownership in the 
United States lies in the ability of a surface estate owner to sever or "split" the 
mineral estate from the surface estate. Where a legal severance is effected, the 
mineral estate may be sold, leased or retained by reservation or exception in a 
sale of the land. The creation of a mineral estate does not result in any 
renouncement of title by a surface estate holder, as the severance of sub-
surface minerals will not affect the title of a surface estate. As outlined by the 
court in Del Monte Mining & Milling Co v. Last Chance Mining & Milling 
Co., "unquestionably, at common law the owner of the soil might convey his 
interest in minerals beneath the surface without relinquishing his title to the 
surface."77 
                                                             
75 See Pierce, supra note 67, at 244 (arguing that where overlapping 
rights exist, and each can impact the community and vice versa, a common 
ownership framework along the lines espoused by Professor Carol Rose 
works more effectively). 
76 See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996) (arguing that the rigid ownership boundaries 
connected with conventional property do not work effectively with common 
property). 
77 Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling 
Co., 171 U.S. 55, 60 (1898). 
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The right of a surface estate holder to sever a mineral estate is derived 
from the common law concept of accession, which assumes, in line with the 
ad coelum maxim, that minerals contained within the subsoil are regarded as 
a part of the subsoil and are therefore owned by the landowner. As such, the 
landowner has the capacity to deal with them separately. The doctrine of 
severance has, however, been criticized because the sub-surface is not 
divisible in the same way as the surface; there are no boundaries between 
sub-surface strata and sub-surface minerals as they are both fully integrated.78 
When properly created, a mineral estate owner will acquire an interest in 
the land giving them the right to use the land in any way that is reasonably 
necessary for the development of the mineral estate.79 This effectively means 
that when the mineral owner's activities conflict with a use by the surface 
owner, the claims of the mineral owner will prevail.80 
Mineral estates in the United States are subject to two different 
ownership theories: the ownership in place theory and the non-ownership 
theory. According to the ownership-in-place theory, which has been adopted 
in many states, fugacious minerals form a constituent of the strata of the earth 
and must therefore be treated as a part of the realty while they remain in 
situ.81 A mineral estate created pursuant to the ownership in place theory will 
                                                             
78 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 304–06 (acknowledging the historical 
criticism of this approach, whereby it was argued that the surface is divisible 
but a mine is not; that a mine is never coextensive with the surface and that 
the system was destined to lead to confusion over the ownership of the mine 
and its exploitation). 
79 E.g., Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863, 872 (Tex. 
1961). 
80 Herbert C. Manning, Mineral Rights versus Surface Rights, 2 NAT. 
RESOURCES LAW. 329, 331 (1969). 
81 This ownership theory is followed in Texas, Montana, Colorado, 
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, Tennessee, North 
Dakota, Washington, Arkansas and West Virginia. See WILLIAMS & 
MEYERS, supra note 17, § 203. 
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produce a horizontal severance of sub-surface strata. This type of estate is to 
be treated as a determinable fee simple and is subject to the same real 
property laws and rules as other land estates.82 
The difficulty with mineral estates created pursuant to the ownership in 
place theory is that they are not consistent with the transitory nature of gas, 
which does not necessarily adhere to a particular land boundary. Some states 
have resolved this by holding that the surface estate owner owns the oil and 
gas underlying the boundaries of their property, but that such gas is not "the 
subject of actual possession until brought to the surface" because until that 
occurs there is no way to determine whether oil and gas exists within a 
particular land boundary.83 This means that mineral estates created pursuant 
to the ownership in place theory will apply to transitory minerals, such as 
unconventional gas, but ownership can only be verified where it is possessed 
and controlled.84 
By contrast, according to the non-ownership principle, fugacious 
minerals such as oil and gas are not regarded as a part of the underlying strata 
and may only be owned separately where they are reduced to possession.85 
According to this theory, no person owns oil or gas until it has been 
produced. The only interest that can be owned prior to possession, is the right 
to capture the oil and gas. This right amounts to an incorporeal estate and has 
been defined as a profit a préndre.86 
                                                             
82 See Olson, supra note 8, at 387; see also A.W. Walker Jr., The Nature 
of the Property Interest Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1928). 
83 Boggess v. Milam, 34 S.E.2d 267, 269–70 (W. Va. 1945). 
84 See Olson, supra note 8, at 387 (quoting Boggess v. Milam, 34 S.E.2d 
267, 270 (1945)). 
85 The non-ownership principle has been adopted in Pennsylvania. 
86 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 17, § 203.1. 
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The proprietary difference between a mineral estate arising pursuant to 
the ownership in place theory and a mineral interest arising pursuant to the 
non-ownership theory is fundamental. The former confers upon the holder 
physical ownership of the strata in which the minerals are located. This estate 
includes all ancillary rights necessary to support the extraction of the 
minerals, including rights of access and rights to construct drilling and other 
extraction operations. The latter confers upon the holder an incorporeal right, 
in the form of a right to capture oil and gas from the land. This entitlement 
does not include any physical ownership and therefore does not include any 
right of access.87 
An important concern for unconventional gas lies in the question of 
whether, pursuant to the ownership in place theory, a mineral estate includes 
ownership of the gas that may be contained within that mineral. This issue 
raises classification difficulties and the resolution depends largely upon 
whether unconventional gas should be treated as an independent mineral or a 
component of the mineral reservoir in which it resides.88 For example, if you 
own the sub-surface strata in which shale or coal resides, does that also mean 
that you own the shale or coal bed methane gas that resides within the shale 
or coal? It has been argued that the owner of the strata in which coal exists 
should, logically, also own the coal bed methane that resides within that 
coal.89 If this is not the case, ownership of in situ unconventional gas may 
reside with the surface estate owner. Where a drill has stimulated migration, 
ownership may be verified where the gas is captured and produced. 
                                                             
87 See generally Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Rippley, Split Estate: 
Communication and Education versus Legislation, 4 WYO. L. REV. 585 
(2004). 
88 See Farnell, supra note 1, at 523 (arguing that the owner of a coal-
bearing stratum would also be the owner of coal bed gas found in that 
stratum). 
89 See Olson, supra note 8, at 388 (arguing that the most obvious idea 
underlying the ownership in place theory is that if the coal bed owner owns 
not only the coal but the strata, his claim to the methane which is incidental to 
the coal is "greatly enhanced"). 
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Alternatively, ownership of unconventional gas may reside with the holder of 
a specifically created gas lease. 
In those states where the non-ownership theory is upheld, these issues 
do not apply. According to the theory upheld in those states, unconventional 
gas, including both coal bed methane and, logically, shale gas, belong to the 
holder of a specific "gas" interest, because he retains an exclusive right to 
search for and capture sub-surface, migratory gas.90 
The existence of a multiplicity of sub-surface mineral rights can 
generate a complex array of competing interests. This makes determining the 
boundaries of each interest and the reciprocal duties owed by each mineral 
owner imperative, particularly in the context of unconventional gas 
development. For example, if coal bed methane is owned separately from the 
owner of coal, the coal owner may have responsibilities toward the coal bed 
methane owner, to ensure that coal bed methane gas is not wastefully 
ventilated during the process of coal mining. Similar issues may arise in the 
context of shale gas, particularly given the need to utilize hydro-fracturing to 
extract the gas.91 
D. INTERPRETING THE MINERAL DEED 
A crucial issue underlying a determination of the nature and scope of a 
mineral estate and its application to unconventional gas, is how the wording 
in the mineral deed creating the estate is to be interpreted. As a general rule, 
the parties define their respective rights and obligations within the deed. This 
means that the deed usually confers rights to explore, drill, mine, operate, 
                                                             
90 Michelle D. Baldwin, Note, Ownership of Coalbed Methane Gas: 
Recent Developments in Case Law, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 673, 676 (1998). 
91 See Olson, supra note 8, at 388; see also Baldwin, supra note 90, at 
676 (where the author discusses the two different interpretations of the 
ownership in place theory and considers the implications for the ownership of 
coal bed methane). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 27 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.62 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Ownership Frameworks 
for Unconventional Gas 
Winter 2013 
produce, survey, lay pipelines, and utilize surface facilities for the disposal of 
salt water, construct bridges, build tanks, etc.92 
Where, however, a mineral reservation or grant does not include these 
rights, or where the language of the deed lacks specificity, the common law 
will generally hold in favour of the mineral estate.93 The rationale for this lies 
is that the inherent value of the mineral estate is only truly apparent where 
mineral production is facilitated.94 Hence, the holder of a mineral estate 
should have their reasonable rights to the extraction and production of 
minerals granted pursuant to the doctrine of severance supported and 
prioritized. These core rights may be explicitly outlined within the deed or 
pursuant to an access agreement entered into with the surface owner but 
where they are not, common law will assume their incorporation.95 
An important issue in this context is the scope that should be given to a 
bare reference to "minerals" within a deed. In particular, should a reference to 
"minerals" be taken to incorporate unconventional gas? One of the seminal 
cases to assess this issue with respect to coal bed methane was the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in United States Steel Corporation v. 
Hoge.96 The central issue in this case was whether the holders of a mineral 
                                                             
92 See Leslie Moses, The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas 
Lease, 2 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1, 10 (1951) (where the author 
discusses the derivation of the lease form for oil and gas interests). 
93 See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972). 
94 Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private 
Split Estate Lands, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 432 (1998). 
95 See Douglas R. Hafer, R. Daniel & Logan W. Simmons, Practical 
Guide to Operator/Surface Owner Disputes and the Current State of the 
Accommodation Doctrine, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 47, 51 (2010) (noting 
that despite the court's clear articulation of the priority of the mineral owner's 
surface use rights, surface owners often resist an operator's attempts to enter 
their property). 
96 See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983). 
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estate in coal also had title to the coal bed methane gas located within that 
coal. The deed setting up the mineral estate in the coal conferred all title to 
the coal, but reserved "the right to drill and operate through said coal for oil 
and gas without being held liable for any damages." The surface estate 
owners subsequently conveyed the reserved gas rights to a new gas lessee. 
The new gas lessee commenced drilling, utilizing hydro-fracturing 
procedures. The coal interest holder sought to terminate this intrusion into the 
coal and argued that the coal mineral estate also conferred the right to 
develop and produce coal bed methane.97 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that in Pennsylvania, where the 
non-ownership theory is upheld, the surface estate owner owns a right to 
capture fugacious minerals such as coal bed methane. That title is lost as soon 
as fugacious minerals leave the land and are brought under the control of 
another. Accordingly, the court concluded that whoever owns the property in 
which the gas resides must also owns the gas. Hence, whilst the coal bed 
methane remained within the coal seam, it "must necessarily belong to the 
owner of the coal."98 Once the coal bed methane migrates from the seam and 
enters the surrounding property however, the surface estate owner may claim 
title as it is then regarded as forming a component of the sub-surface strata 
and the surface estate owner is entitled to exercise a right of capture. Justice 
Zappala stated: 
When a landowner conveys a portion of his property, in 
this instance coal, to another, it cannot thereafter be said 
that the property conveyed remains as part of the 
former's land, since title to the severed property rests 
solely in the grantee. In accordance with the foregoing 
principles governing gas ownership, therefore, such gas 
as is present in coal must necessarily belong to the 
owner of the coal, so long as it remains within his 
property and subject to his exclusive dominion and 
control. The landowner, of course, has title to the 
                                                             
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1383. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 29 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.62 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Ownership Frameworks 
for Unconventional Gas 
Winter 2013 
property surrounding the coal, and owns such of the 
coalbed gas as migrates into the surrounding property.99 
Applying these principles to the construction of the mineral deed, the 
Hoge court concluded that the express reservation of "the right to drill and 
operate through said coal for oil and gas without being liable for any 
damages" applied only to natural gas and not to coal bed methane. The court 
considered the intention of the parties at the time when the deed was executed 
and held that at that time, coal bed methane gas was not commercially viable 
and was regarded as a dangerous gas that was usually ventilated from the coal 
seam to prevent the possibility of explosion. Hence, the idea that the parties 
could have intended to reserve a right to exploit a gas of this nature was 
unlikely. According to the court, the better interpretation was that the parties 
intended to reserve a right to exploit any natural gas that may be been 
discovered deeper into the strata, but that the coal bed methane continued to 
belong to the coal owner who could ventilate it to prevent explosions.100 
This decision suggests, at least within non-ownership states, that mineral 
deeds intend to confer upon the holder rights to all minerals commonly 
regarded as such, including any unconventional gas that may be residing 
within those minerals. 
More recently however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Butler v. 
Charles Powers Estate evaluated this issue with respect to shale gas and 
came to a contrary conclusion to that of Hoge, holding that mineral estates 
that describe "minerals," without specific reference to natural gas, do not 
include the shale gas found in the Marcellus shale formation. This means that 
shale gas, unlike coal bed methane, does not belong to the owner of the shale 
                                                             
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1385. 
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mineral but will belong to the surface estate owner whilst it is in situ or a gas 
lessee.101 
On the facts of the case, Charles Powers sold 244 acres of land in 1881 
to the predecessors of the defendants and reserved to himself and his heirs, 
"one half the minerals and Petroleum Oils." In 2009, the surface estate 
owners filed a complaint to quiet title due to shale gas extraction. The heirs of 
Charles Powers filed for a declaratory judgment that the reservation included 
Marcellus shale formation and gas contained within that formation and that as 
such, the surface estate owners had no ownership claim to the gas. 
The Butler court distinguished the Hoge decision, arguing that the 
characteristics of coal bed methane and the circumstances associated with that 
decision could be contrasted to the nature and characteristics of shale gas. 
Two broad grounds for distinction were articulated. First, unlike shale gas, at 
the time when the mineral estate was created in Hoge, coal bed methane was 
regarded as a dangerous gas, which was not commercially viable. Coal bed 
methane gas had to be ventilated to promote safety during the process of coal 
mining. This made it imperative for the coal owner to retain ownership rights 
in the coal bed methane. 
Second, the Butler court argued that the Hoge decision, whilst 
recognizing the chemical similarities between coal bed methane and natural 
gas, nevertheless made an inherent legal distinction between the two when it 
upheld the right of the landowner, pursuant to their reservation, to drill 
through the coal seam to obtain natural gas. The Butler court argued that the 
gas found in Marcellus shale was best defined as natural gas that had become 
trapped within the Marcellus Shale instead of rising to the more permeable 
sand formations below the surface.102 This meant that, as in Hoge, the surface 
estate owner rather than the owner of the mineral estate retained ownership 
rights. 
                                                             
101 See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d. 885, 
892–98 (Pa. 2013). 
102 Id. at 899. 
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A further important issue relevant to the Butler decision was the issue of 
whether the mineral estate included rights to shale gas, despite their being no 
explicit conferral of those rights. This required an evaluation of the ongoing 
relevance of what is known in Pennsylvania as the Dunham rule. This old 
common law interpretational rule, unique to Pennsylvania, assumes that a 
reference to minerals does not, in the absence of any express indication to the 
contrary, include natural gas. 
E. THE DUNHAM RULE 
Where a mineral estate holder is seeking to explore and/or produce 
unconventional gas, it is necessary to determine whether a mineral grant or 
reservation that refers only to a transfer of "minerals" may be taken to include 
a transfer of gas and whether it includes unconventional gas. Whilst shale and 
coal bed methane are widely accepted as minerals, the approach taken to this 
issue will depend upon the State in which the deed is reviewed. 
In Pennsylvania, one of the ancient rules relevant to this determination is 
the Dunham rule. The rule is derived from the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania in Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick where it was held that a 
reservation in a deed of "all minerals" did not include oil because the plain, 
ordinary and popular meaning of the term "minerals" does not include oil and 
refers only to metallic minerals.103 This decision has come to be referred to as 
the Dunham rule and has been consistently applied as an established rule of 
property to exclude natural gas where the deed of grant or reservation refers 
only to "minerals." The Dunham decision was subsequently expanded in 
Silver v. Bush, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically concluded 
                                                             
103 Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 40 (Pa. 1882). The Dunham rule 
had its genesis in the decision, Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 41 (Pa. 1836), 
where the court concluded that in interpreting the intent of the parties when 
creating a minerals deed, "to people entirely destitute of scientific knowledge 
in regard to such things . . . [n]othing is thought by them [minerals] to be such 
unless it be of a metallic nature, such as gold, silver, iron, copper, lead [etc.]." 
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natural gas was another mineral which did not come within the meaning of 
the term used in reservations and grants.104 
The Dunham rule is well established and over the years has acquired the 
status of a firmly entrenched rule of property, automatically binding in all 
cases where a deed of reservation or grant does not expressly include oil or 
natural gas.105 The ostensible rationale is that a reference to minerals should 
only be assumed to include those minerals which come within the "ordinary 
sense" or "popular estimation" of the word. At the time when the Dunham 
and the Silver v. Bush decisions were handed down, it was felt that natural 
gas was not a resource popularly regarded as a mineral. 
The Dunham rule been consistently upheld in Pennsylvania, despite 
dramatic social changes and some clear and cogent evidence that natural gas 
is now commonly regarded as a mineral.106 Natural gas has, for example, 
been expressly included within the legislative definition of a mineral in 
specific Pennsylvania statutes.107 Subsequent cases have articulated the 
Dunham rule as a principle of construction, however this appears forced 
                                                             
104 Silver v. Bush, 62 A. 832, 833–34 (1906). 
105 Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398–99 (Pa. 1960). 
106 See, e.g., Preston v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 1913) 
(holding that the Dunham rule "has been the law of this state for 30 years, and 
very many titles to land rest upon it"); see also Bundy v. Myers, 94 A.2d 724, 
726 (Pa. 1953) where the Dunham rule was upheld. 
107 See, e.g., the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 805, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10107 (West 2013) which 
expressly includes natural gas within the definition of "minerals." In Charles 
Powers Estate, 65 A.3d at 890, the court concluded that scientifically, natural 
gas comes within the definition of a mineral because "the world of science 
has three "kingdoms" of material—animal, plant, and mineral—and oil and 
gas are obviously not animals or plants." 
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when consideration is given to the fact that sub-surface minerals are capable 
of evolving in line with technological advancements.108 
The court in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate continued this tradition 
and firmly upheld the Dunham rule, concluding that where the terms "oil" or 
"natural" gas are not specifically included within a private deed of reservation 
for mineral rights, they will not be encompassed without clear and convincing 
parol evidence indicating otherwise.109 The Butler court held that there was 
no justification for overruling or limiting the Dunham rule and that it had 
formed "the bedrock for innumerable private, real property transactions for 
nearly two centuries."110 Justice Baer reasoned, that too many settled 
expectations rest upon this rule for the courts to upset it retroactively, and that 
it amounted to an "unaltered, unwavering rule of property law for 131 years" 
which should not be overthrown in the absence of good reason.111 
The Butler court therefore concluded that all forms of natural gas, 
including unconventional shale gas, are to be presumptively regarded as 
beyond the ordinary definition of a "mineral" for the purposes of private 
deeds.112 The court further concluded that even if the shale in which the gas 
resides could be regarded as a mineral in itself, "there is no merit in any 
                                                             
108 See, e.g., Silver v. Bush, 62 A. at 833 (where the court held that the 
"crucial question . . . is what was the sense in which the parties used the 
word?"). 
109 Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d at 896. In this respect, the court 
argued at 897 that the Dunham rule has been an "unaltered, unwavering 
property rule for 131 years." In this respect the court quoted from Highland v. 
Commonwealth, noting that "a rule of property long acquiesced in should not 
be overthrown except for compelling reasons of public policy or the 
imperative demands of justice." Id. at 897 (quoting Highland, 161 A.2d at 
399 n.5). 
110 Id. at 897. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 899. 
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contention that this consequentially renders the natural shale gas a mineral 
coming within the scope of the grant or reservation."113 
Whilst the Dunham rule is ostensibly a rule of construction, devised to 
assist in the interpretation of mineral deeds, the established and well-
entrenched nature of the rule has meant that Pennsylvania courts articulate it 
more as a property concept than a canon of construction.114 This appears to 
have become the case despite the fact such an application is inconsistent with 
the original judgment in Dunham. The actual Dunham decision was 
motivated by a desire to avoid interpreting the particular deed of reservation 
too broadly for fear that it might be found to be void for repugnancy on the 
grounds that it was as extensive as the actual grant.115 
The consequence of extending the Dunham rule to include Marcellus 
shale gas is that in Pennsylvania today, all mineral estates that do not 
expressly refer to natural or unconventional gas will have no ownership claim 
over the gas. This means that the ownership of shale gas will, where a gas 
interest has been bifurcated from a mineral estate, reside with the holder of a 
gas lease or, where this has not occurred, with the surface estate owner where 
the owner has captured and produced the gas. 
The decision of the Butler court to reinforce the Dunham rule as a rule 
of property is largely a consequence of its entrenched status. The decision 
ignores the fact that this common law rule evolved within a social context 
that preceded the unconventional gas boom. Whilst many property deeds may 
                                                             
113 Id. 
114 Daniel B. Kostrub & Roger S. Christenson II, Canons of 
Construction for the Interpretation of Mineral Conveyances, Severances, 
Exceptions and Reservations in Producing States, 88 N.D. L. REV. 649, 686–
88 (2012) (arguing that the settled nature of the Dunham rule has meant that 
the Pennsylvania courts have not relied heavily on canons of deed 
construction). 
115 Bernerd A. Buzgon, The Highland Case: An Extension of the 
Dunham Rule to Grants, 65 DICK. L. REV. 159, 159 (1961). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 35 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.62 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Ownership Frameworks 
for Unconventional Gas 
Winter 2013 
have been issued in Pennsylvania in reliance on the rule, its ongoing 
relevance in a contemporary context is questionable. 
The shale gas revolution could not have been anticipated in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century when the Dunham rule first emerged. 
Back in this era, the concept of a mineral had a strong corporeal sensibility 
within the community.116 In the United States today, the advent of 
unconventional gas has become so widespread, it is nonsensical to perpetuate 
a presumptive rule of construction based upon outdated social assumptions 
that relate to a different era.117 Whilst rules of interpretation may mandate a 
temporal evaluation of the intention of the parties at the time when the 
mineral deed was created, where no such intention is apparent, as is often the 
case, it is appropriate to focus upon the presumed "general" intent of the 
parties.118 Such an approach allows for a greater degree of judicial and 
contextual discretion.119 
The concept of a "mineral" is not static and therefore should not be 
interpreted as an inert concept. The definition of a mineral must necessarily 
be demarcated by reference to the social, environmental and scientific 
circumstances in which it is placed. In the absence of an explicit intention by 
the original parties creating the deed, a reference to a "mineral" should be 
taken to include the general intentions of the parties. These may be assessed 
through an examination of the subject matter, context and circumstances of 
                                                             
116 See generally Buzgon, supra note 115. 
117 Christopher S. Kulander, The Common Law Aspects of Shale Oil and 
Gas Development, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 367–68 (2013) (discussing the dramatic 
increase in tension between surface estate owners and mineral estate owners 
following the expansion of unconventional gas development). 
118 David E. Pierce, Evaluating the Jurisprudential Basis for 
Ascertaining or Defining Coalbed Methane Ownership, 4 WYO. L. REV. 607, 
608–09 (2004). 
119 See Pierce, supra note 118, at 613 (arguing that an evaluation of the 
general intent of the parties from contractual rules of construction often 
involves judicial discretion and manipulation). 
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the mineral deed. This broad based assessment should not overlook the 
inexorable transition that physical landscapes experience over time. Nor 
should it ignore social and technological advancements that allow for the 
extraction of resources that would not have been possible at the time when 
the deed was created.120 
The Dunham rule was originally intended to function as a rule of 
construction, giving a common sense definition to the concept of a "mineral" 
within a non-specific deed of reservation or grant. Unfortunately, the strict 
application of the rule has resulted, in the words of Professor Kuntz, in a 
nonsensical approach, as the rule seeks to determine whether the parties 
intended to include or exclude a specific substance rather than evaluating a 
more generalized intention. This confined application does not give effect to 
the substantial purpose of the rule and prevents it from adapting to 
accommodate future substances, unknown or without commercial value, at 
the point when the mineral reservation was created.121 
                                                             
120 See Kostrub & Christenson, supra note 114, at 697 (where the 
authors note that, in the absence of clear intentions, who can say that the 
meaning finally determined to the parties "intent" was what those individuals 
had in mind when executing the deed decades ago). 
121 See Eugene Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 34 
OKLA. L. REV. 28, 34 (1981). Professor Kuntz suggests that a better test 
would be as follows: 
. . . the severance should be construed to sever from the 
surface all substances presently valuable in themselves, 
apart from the soil, whether their presence is known or 
not, and all substances which become valuable through 
development of the arts and sciences, and that nothing 
presently or prospectively valuable as extracted 
substances would be intended to be excluded from the 
mineral estate. 
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The reification of the Dunham rule effectively means that Marcellus 
shale gas in Pennsylvania will continue to remain with the surface estate 
owner, unless and until an express gas lease is created. This will invariably 
result in a proliferation of sub-surface estates with overlapping rights and the 
potential for multitudinous conflicts. Any gas lease issued will need to take 
account of an existing mineral estate and accommodate the rights of that 
mineral estate. It also means that surface estate owners need to be cognizant 
of the increasing pressure from mining companies to issue such leases.122 
The Dunham rule has not been adopted in other states. A number of 
Tennessee decisions have actually formed fundamentally different 
conclusions to the Dunham rule and these decisions have come to be known 
as the "majority rule."123 In Murray v. Allard, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
concluded that the definition of a mineral did include oil and gas and that the 
bulk of mankind would consider oil and gas to be minerals.124 Many other 
states have followed this conclusion.125 To date, the Tennessee courts have 
not reached a determination as to whether shale gas comes within the 
definition of "minerals" within a private deed of reservation. It would seem, 
however, given the broad approach of the majority rule, that a non-specific 
conveyance in that state would necessarily include shale and shale gas.126 
The dramatic expansion of unconventional gas in the United States 
needs to be supported by innovative institutional development. Many 
                                                             
122 See Laura C. Reeder, Creating a Legal Framework for Marcellus 
Shale Gas, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 999, 1007 (2010) 
(where the author notes that surface owners will increasingly need to be 
protected from exploitation by drilling companies). 
123 KUNTZ, supra note 121, at 32. 
124 Murray v. Allard, 43 S.W. 355 (1897); see also J.M. Huber Corp. v. 
Square Enters, 645 S.W.2d 410, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) ("[T]he word 
mineral encompasses not only oil and gas but hard minerals.") (internal 
quotation omitted). 
125 KUNTZ, supra note 121, at 32. 
126 See Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
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established common law property rules are weighed down by historical 
baggage and have little continuing relevance, particularly where they have 
their genesis in assumptions regarding the physical characteristics of 
resources and the limits of technology which have since been discredited by 
science.127 
The extension and adaptation of core ownership principles to 
unconventional gas has generated complexity and uncertainty. Much of the 
concern stems from the irregular location of the gas and its particular 
extraction requirements. The development of advanced technological 
extraction processes has generated liability issues that could not have been 
envisaged with orthodox drilling processes. Further, courts have failed to 
apply conventional ownership principles to unconventional gas in a consistent 
and rational manner. This has generated a strong imperative for targeted 
statutory provisions to be introduced in all relevant states, which define the 
nature, scope and boundaries of unconventional gas ownership and identify 
the reciprocal obligations owed between adjoining sub-surface interest 
holders. 
3. THE AUSTRALIAN FRAMEWORK 
A. STATE OWNERSHIP OF UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 
Unlike the United States, in most Australian states and territories, 
ownership of natural gas, including unconventional gas, has either been 
reserved or vested in the state pursuant to specific statutory provisions 
enacted pursuant to state mining and petroleum legislation.128 The 
                                                             
127 See Rule, supra note 6, at 805 (arguing that courts and legislatures 
will need to adjust existing property rules to accommodate new forms of 
energy development). 
128 See Petroleum (Onshore) Act 1991 (NSW) § 6; Petroleum and Gas 
(Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld.) § 26; Mineral Resources 
(Sustainable Development) Act 1990 (Vic.) § 9; Petroleum and Geothermal 
Energy Resources Act 1967 (WA) § 10. 
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introduction of these provisions has significantly diminished the rights of the 
surface estate owner under the common law ad coelum doctrine.129 For the 
most part, the common law right to minerals that used reside with the surface 
estate owner have now been abrogated in favour of public or state-based 
mineral ownership.130 
A state-based ownership framework depends upon a fundamental 
distinction between ownership of the surface and ownership of the subsoil. 
Ownership of minerals contained in the subsoil is attributed to the state either 
as a juridical body or as the representative of the collective body.131 This type 
of framework is known as the dominial or regalian system and it originates 
from the right imposed by the sovereign monarch, upon the owner of the 
mining fields, to secure payment or participation in the extracted mining 
product.132 
A state-based ownership regime depends upon the constitutional 
legitimacy of the legislative provisions that confer ownership in sub-surface 
minerals upon the state. In Australia, the mining and petroleum legislation 
has a state focus and this precludes the vesting provisions from being subject 
to any application of the Commonwealth Constitution. In particular, it 
                                                             
129 See Adrian J. Bradbrook, Relevance of the Cujus Est Solum Doctrine 
to the Surface Landowner's Claims to Natural Resources Located above and 
beneath the Land, 11 ADEL. L. REV. 462, 464 (1988). 
130 Tina Hunter & Michael Weir, Property Rights and Coal Seam Gas 
Extraction: The Modern Property Law Conundrum, 2 PROP. L. REV. 71, 77 
(2012). 
131 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 307. 
132 See generally James K. Boyce, From Natural Resources to Natural 
Assets, in NATURAL ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP 
(James K. Boyce & Barry G. Shelley eds., 2003). 
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precludes the surface estate owner seeking compensation pursuant to the just 
terms provision under § 51(xxxi).133 
The statutory vesting provisions effect a statutory severance of the 
mineral ownership from the surface estate. This means that in Australia, 
minerals coming within the scope of the vesting provisions do not form a 
component of a ownership rights held by a surface estate owners. Hence, 
unlike the United States, a surface estate owner is unable to create a separate, 
private mineral estate.134 The definition given to minerals or petroleum within 
most mining and petroleum acts is extremely broad. For all effects and 
purposes this means that the state now owns most commercially viable sub-
surface minerals, including coal, oil, petroleum, metals, iron ore, hydro-
carbons and natural gas.135 
The distinction between common law mineral ownership and statutory 
mineral ownership is important in a dominial framework and this is the core 
divergence between mineral ownership in Australia and the United States. As 
discussed above, in the United States, under common law, accession 
framework mineral ownership stems from the fundamental entitlement of a 
                                                             
133 See Simon Evans, When is an Acquisition of Property not an 
Acquisition of Property, 11 PUB. LAW REV. 183 (2001). 
134 See generally Yinka Omorogbe & Peter Oniemola, Property Rights 
in Oil and Gas Under Dominial Regimes in PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN 
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 115, 118 (Aileen McHarg et al. eds., 
2010); see also Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining 
Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries Through Middle-Ground Policies, 20 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 204 (2013). 
135 See, e.g., the definition of "petroleum" in the Petroleum (Onshore) 
Act 1991 (NSW), (Austl.) § 3 which means: "(a) any naturally occurring 
hydrocarbon, whether in a gaseous, liquid or solid state, or (b) any naturally 
occurring mixture of hydrocarbons, whether in a gaseous, liquid or solid 
state, or (c) any naturally occurring mixture of one or more hydrocarbons, 
whether in a gaseous, liquid or solid state, and one or more of the following, 
that is to say, hydrogen sulphide, nitrogen, helium, carbon dioxide and 
water." 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 41 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.62 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Ownership Frameworks 
for Unconventional Gas 
Winter 2013 
surface estate owner to sever the minerals from the land by executing a 
legally valid mineral interest.136 The nature and scope of a common law 
mineral estate depends upon the rights and interests conferred within the deed 
and how those rights are subsequently constructed, in accordance with 
established common law principles.137 
By contrast, statutory mineral ownership is derived completely from the 
terms of the legislative provisions. Where a statute creates a property interest, 
there are different ways in which it may be construed.138 The statute may 
validate a preconceived interest, by vesting title in the state, or the statute 
may be treated as creating a completely new property expression, whose 
internal characteristics bear little resemblance to the common law form.139 
Where, however, a statute vests a property interest it is assumed that a pre-
existing interest exists. 
The provisions vesting ownership of minerals in the state are derived 
from two fundamental assumptions: (i) that minerals have the capacity to be 
divested from the sub-surface strata in which they are located and (ii) that the 
ownership rights that vest in the state are ownership rights in the mineral 
rather than ownership of the corporeal strata in which the minerals are 
                                                             
136 See generally Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 
18 A.725 (1889) (discussing that oil and gas that exist in the subsurface strata 
belong to the surface owner and will continue to do so until they are severed 
from the freehold. The capacity of the surface estate owner to create a mineral 
estate is often referred to as the "doctrine of severance"). 
137 See Kostrub & Christenson, supra note 114. 
138 See generally Anthony Scott, Property Rights and Property Wrongs, 
16 CAN. J. ECON. 555 (1983) (discussing the different roles that statute and 
common law have played in the evolution of property). 
139 For different ways in which statutory mining rights may be expressed 
are see Mathew Storey, Not of this Earth: The Extra-Terrestrial Nature of 
Statutory Property in the 21st Century, 25 AUS. RES. & ENERGY L.J. 51, 54 
(2006). 
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located.140 The vesting provisions seek to validate the transfer of pre-existing 
mineral ownership rather than actually generating a new ownership interest 
and in this sense rely implicitly on the doctrine of severance.141 
The statutory vesting of mineral ownership gives the state the power to 
issue titles to mining companies over privately held freehold land, Crown 
leases and land that is subject to native title claims.142 This has been 
described as the "concession system" whereby the state, as the original owner 
of mineral resources, grants rights for the exploration and exploitation of 
minerals to an applicant, provided the applicant meets objective and 
impersonal legal requirements.143 The concession framework allows the state 
to confer permissory rights to extract sub-surface minerals to mining 
companies who, depending upon the character of the license issued, acquire 
cumulative rights to access, explore or produce sub-surface minerals. Mining 
licenses differ substantially to mining estates in that they confer permissory 
rights to enter, explore and produce sub-surface minerals but do not confer 
actual ownership rights in the mineral themselves.144 
In this respect, mining licenses do not constitute ownership interests in 
the sub-surface strata nor do they constitute incorporeal hereditaments. 
Rather, they amount to statute based permissory entitlements, which allow 
the holder to carry out specific exploration, retention or production rights.145 
State ownership of sub-surface minerals will not be extinguished by the 
issuance of a statutory mining license. Any concession issued by a state is 
generally only a temporary right to exploit a mine or reservoir, the ownership 
                                                             
140 See Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 134, at 120. 
141 Id. 
142 See, e.g., Petroleum (Onshore) Act of 1991 (NSW) §§ 69A–D. 
143 See Wieland, supra note 134, n.35. 
144 See generally Michael Crommelin, The Legal Character of 
Resources Titles, 17 AUS. MINING & PETROLEUM L.J. 57 (1998). 
145 Id. at 62. 
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of which remains in the state and will continue to be the property of the state 
after the concession has expired.146 Once a sub-surface mineral is actually 
produced, however, ownership of that produced mineral is then transferred 
from the state to the license holder via statutory vesting provisions.147 This 
type of provision is akin to the common law rule of capture, as it is exists in 
the United States, as the possession and production of the mineral confirms 
the transfer of ownership rights in the mineral. 
The state ownership framework provides a solid foundation for the 
progression of the unconventional gas industry in Australia. The difficulties 
associated with non-responsive common law ownership principles, as 
experienced in the United States, do not exist in Australia because the 
framework is characterized by consistent and enduring state ownership. In 
this respect, the dominial framework avoids the difficulties associated with 
interconnecting mineral estate ownership and the innumerable problems 
connected with the interpretation and construction of private deeds by 
reference to common law principles. 
The primary issue confronting unconventional gas development in 
Australia is the impact that issued mining licenses have had upon surface 
estate ownership.148 When the state issues mining licenses that allow mining 
companies to explore for, retain or produce unconventional gas such as coal 
bed methane or shale, the ownership rights of surface estate holders are often 
                                                             
146 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 310 (noting that under a state 
ownership framework, any "concession" issued by the state usually only 
exists for a limited period of time). 
147 See, e.g., Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 
(Qld.) §§ 11, 28 (wherein it sets out that where a person produces petroleum, 
it becomes the person's property. In this context, petroleum is expressly 
defined to include a natural gas and therefore would cover unconventional 
gas such as coal bed methane or shale). 
148 See Kate Galloway, Landowner's versus Miner's Property Interests: 
The Unsustainability of Property as a Dominion, 37 ALT. L.J. 77, 80 (2012) 
(outlining the conflict generated by this private/public ownership divide). 
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significantly impacted. In the United States, surface owners retain control 
over sub-surface minerals and constitutional amendments reinforce the core 
integrity of these private ownership rights. This framework ensures 
landowners are directly involved in the development of extractive rights for 
unconventional gas development. 
By comparison, the state ownership framework in Australia has 
disengaged the landowner from the development of extractive mining rights 
and this has generated significant landowner opposition. This opposition is 
largely sourced in misconceptions regarding the scope of land ownership and 
the impact of the statutory vesting provisions. It is difficult for many surface 
owners to comprehend that their land is now fully amenable to the legal 
entitlements of mining license holders. In this respect, the interface between 
the state ownership of minerals and the private ownership of the surface 
estate is complex because it disturbs the intuitive assumptions underlying the 
natural accession between sub-surface land and minerals.149 
B. LAND ACCESS CONCERNS 
The nature and scope of the access entitlements held by license holders 
is the source of much contention and debate in many states across Australia. 
In this respect, the mining legislation in most states fails to clearly articulate 
the relationship between land and mineral ownership. The common law 
framework is unburdened by these concerns because the ad coelum principle 
assumes that the surface owner is also the owner of sub-surface minerals 
unless those minerals are migratory. The separation of land and mineral 
ownership under a dominial framework necessitates the need for interposed 
                                                             
149 See generally Wang Mingyuan, Natural Gas Development and Land 
Use: Conflict Between Legal Rights and its Resolution, PROPERTY AND THE 
LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 165 (Aileen McHarg et al. eds., 
2010) (arguing that ownership arrangements that separate land from mineral 
resources are good for state planning and administration but they lay the 
foundation for conflict between natural gas development and land rights). 
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access entitlements.150 These entitlements are usually statute based which 
means that their scope and focus may vary according to the jurisdiction in 
which they are recognized. 
For example, in Queensland the Petroleum and Gas (Production and 
Safety) Act 2004 (Qld.) sets out that the holder of a petroleum lease confers 
upon the holder the right to carry out exploration, production and storage 
activities, rights to construct and operate petroleum pipelines, rights to carry 
out the processing of petroleum in the area of the lease and to construct and 
operate a facility for the processing, storage or transport of petroleum in the 
area of the lease as well as rights to carry out activities which are reasonably 
necessary or incidental to these authorized activities.151 These statutory 
entitlements anticipate land access but only for the purpose of conducting 
authorized statutory rights. 
It is not possible for a surface estate owner to completely deny access to 
a mining license holder given the scope and range of the statutory 
entitlements conferred. However, the impact of increased access entitlements, 
as a result of the dramatic expansion in unconventional gas production, has 
prompted some states to the implement land access codes.152 In Queensland, 
the access entitlements for all petroleum leases, petroleum being defined 
broadly to include unconventional gas, are subject to a comprehensive code 
of behavior that seeks to regulate the manner in which these entitlements are 
                                                             
150 See generally Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 134. 
151 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld.) §§ 109–
112 (Austl.). 
152 A land access code has been introduced in Queensland and has been 
proposed for New South Wales as a consequence of increased coal bed 
methane development. See Department of Employment, Economic 
Development and Innovation, Land Access Code, Nov. 2010, at http://mines 
.industry.qld.gov.au/assets/land-tenure-pdf/land_access_code_nov2010 .pdf. 
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enforced and thereby mediate the interface between surface and mineral 
ownership.153 
The Land Access Code (Qld.) seeks to ensure that the landholder is 
properly and reasonably notified of the rights and activities of the license 
holder, that surface land damage is properly remediated, that adequate 
compensation is provided to the landholder as agreed between the parties and 
that the rights, and that privacy and activities of the landholder are properly 
respected.154 
The Queensland code prescribes a range of mandatory provisions that 
reflect some of the core problems encountered by landholders subject to 
mining licenses. The mandatory provisions include the requirement that a 
license holder utilize an existing access point, road or track to enter a 
landholder's land, operate vehicles at reasonable speeds, repair any damage 
caused to such access tracks, use the land in a manner that minimizes 
disturbance to people, livestock and property, take reasonable steps to prevent 
the spread of declared pests, set up a camp where the location, plan and 
management has been agreed upon with the landholder or in a manner that 
minimizes landholder business or land use activities, collect rubbish and 
waste, close gates, repair grids and obtain consent prior to erecting any gate 
or cutting a fence on the landholders land.155 
The recent introduction of this Code is illustrative of the significant 
impact unconventional gas expansion is having upon landowner activities. 
This is particularly the case in the eastern states of Australia, where 
unconventional gas has disturbed the established pattern of landowner 
                                                             
153 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld.), § 299 
(Austr.) (defining coal seam gas (coal bed methane) as "petroleum"); 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld.) § 24A (Austr.). 
154 Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation: 
Land Access Code 2010 (Qld.) (Austr.) Part 2, § 4. 
155 See generally Department of Employment, Economic Development 
and Innovation: Land Access Code 2010 (Qld.) (Austr.) Part 3. 
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behavior, encouraging activitism and political mobilization.156 Regulating the 
way in which land access is conducted provides some relief for aggrieved 
landholders but it cannot redress the core concern, exacerbated by the 
development of unconventional gas, that the segregation of land and mineral 
ownership creates irreconcilable ownership domains. 
The conceptualization of discrete private and state ownership bundles 
for corporeal resources that reside together creates a transection of rights that 
are difficult to align.157 Private landowners holding exclusive rights to control 
the land are necessarily qualified by the exclusive right of mineral holders to 
control the minerals. Whilst the qualification of land ownership by 
incorporeal encumbrances is well established, the idea that landownership 
precludes mineral ownership despite the physical assimilation of the two is 
perplexing and divisive.158 
These problems highlight the impact that ownership frameworks can 
have upon individuals and the communities in which they reside. It is 
arguable that the dominial framework for mineral ownership undermines the 
capacity of property rights to shape and facilitate community life and to 
                                                             
156 See generally Tim Boisel, Coal Seam Gas Exploration and 
Production in New South Wales: The Case for Better Strategic Planning and 
More Strategic Regulation, 29 ENV. PLANNING L.J. 129 (2012) (outlining the 
political, strategic and planning tensions that CSG production has created in 
Australia). 
157 See generally Aileen McHarg, Property and the Law in Natural 
Resources, PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
12 (Aileen McHarg et al. eds., 2010) (describing that ownership arrangements 
that separate land from mineral resources are good for state planning and 
administration but lay the foundation for conflict between natural gas 
development and land rights). 
158 See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights 
Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 
1000 (2006) (discussing that state property rights are disruptive and rely upon 
coercive agencies that have the potential to be ignored). 
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respond effectively to what has been described as the "social-obligation 
norm" that underlies all property relationships.159 Landowners, particularly 
those who have held the land for generations and who have established 
strong, productive surface industries, have come to perceive their ownership 
bundle as conferring a level exclusivity which is inconsistent with the feudal 
and statutory context in which it exists. 
This perceptional incongruity is particularly manifest with the extensive 
expansion of unconventional gas interests into agricultural and residential 
areas. For the first time, private landowners have been forced to accept the 
qualified nature of their ownership. The resultant conflict suggests that in 
Australia, the dominial framework neither reflects nor engages community 
attitudes and that it exists to support the timely issuance of mining licenses 
and the acquisition of state mining royalties.160 
The rapid introduction of legislative protections for landowners 
illustrates the increasing difficulties state governments face in upholding a 
strict dominial framework in the face of expanding unconventional gas 
interests.161 State ownership of minerals is often rationalized on the grounds 
that minerals need to be articulated as public property so they may be 
conserved and managed for the welfare of all the citizens.162 This argument 
                                                             
159 See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009); see also Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 764 (2009). 
160 See generally Alan Randall, Coal Seam Gas: Towards a Risk 
Management Framework for a Novel Intervention, 29 ENVTL. PLANNING L.J. 
152 (2012) (discussing of the conflict that has ensured in Australia following 
the progression of the coal bed methane industry). 
161 See generally Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of 
Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169 (2012). 
162 See Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria's 
Emergence as a Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty? 21 
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 440–41 (2009) (where the author raises the 
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has little resonance for Australian rural industries and communities whose 
land and environment has been dramatically affected by the expansion of 
unconventional gas mining.163 Arguably, the spectacular growth of 
unconventional gas illustrates how a private, common law property 
framework, despite the many internal constraints, has a more intrinsic and 
functional social and community utility than a state ownership framework. 
C. REFORM PROPOSALS 
Globally, the widespread exploitation of unconventional gas presents 
significant challenges for mineral ownership regimes. In the United States, 
the shale revolution has generated unprecedented policy concerns for energy 
development and the ownership framework has struggled to respond. 
Common law principles that originated in a different energy era have had 
difficulty responding to the scale and impact of unconventional gas 
development. Orthodox common law principles have evolved in an ad hoc 
and inconsistent manner creating a jurisdictional patchwork of laws. In 
Australia, the state ownership framework has encountered significant 
antagonism as landowners struggle to deal with the realization that the 
separation of land and mineral ownership has detached them from mining 
development that may devastate industries and livelihoods. 
                                                                                                                              
public welfare argument of state owned minerals); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Private Property and the Politics of Environmental Protection, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 76 (2005) (arguing that wealth, capitalization 
and accountability effects boost private law efforts to enhance environmental 
quality and creates conditions for its effective regulation); cf. PAUL COLLIER, 
THE PLUNDERED PLANET: WHY WE MUST—AND HOW WE CAN—MANAGE 
NATURE AND GLOBAL PROPENSITY 93 (2010) (noting that for many 
countries, the state ownership framework has provided very little welfare, 
with the record ranging from "poor to catastrophic"). 
163 See Rural Affairs and Transport Reference Committee, Interim 
Report: The Impact of Coal Seam Gas on the Management of the Murray 
Darling Basin (Nov. 2011), accessed at http://www 
.basinsustainabilityalliance.org/cms-assets/documents/40741-577664.senate-
interim-report-mdb.pdf. 
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There is no simple resolution. The private ownership model in the 
United States has given landowners greater engagement, however this has 
been achieved through the creation of a complex array of overlapping mineral 
estates with interpretational and liability issues. The state ownership 
framework avoids these difficulties, but has had to deal with different 
concerns stemming from the opposition, resentment, and resistance of 
landowners who have been detached from the development process. 
Reform proposals must focus upon the importance of increased 
regulatory intervention as a means of improving the transition to 
unconventional gas. In the United States, this is best achieved through the 
introduction of further legislation, in all relevant states, clarifying the unique 
status of mineral estates and gas leases as qualified and highly reciprocal 
interests. The introduction of legislation outlining ownership boundaries is 
vital as it will help to determine the validity of trespass claims for 
hydrofracturing. Common law principles do not have the institutional 
capacity to deal effectively with this issue. The correlative rights doctrine 
evolved to qualify the unmitigated application of the rule of capture. It cannot 
be relied upon to resolve the issue of trespass liability for hydro-fracturing 
activities.164 Statutory clarification regarding the nature of subsurface trespass 
and the extent to which the rule of capture can justify the utilization of hydro-
fracturing activities for the extraction of unconventional gas is desperately 
required. Whilst well-spacing regulations and proration orders in each state 
have helped parties "capture" their fair share of migratory minerals, further 
legislative articulation outlining the activities the rule of capture covers is 
necessary in order to properly elucidate liability issues.165 
A further reform proposal for the United States lies in the possibility of 
introducing legislative provisions that expressly recognize the "shared" status 
of subsurface mining interests. This could feasibly be achieved by mineral 
                                                             
164 See Poindexter, supra note 66. 
165 See R.R. Comm'n of Tex v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 572 (Tex. 
1962) (In Texas, the Railroad Commission has general powers to regulate the 
oil and gas production.). 
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estate owners agreeing on the percentage of ownership each would hold in 
mineral resources prior to drilling being undertaken.166 Statutory provisions 
could make such private arrangements mandatory and could also compel a 
unified approach to the issue of when, where and how unconventional gas 
interests may be exploited. 
Models suggested include the conferral of votes for sharing owners, 
which would be proportionate to the amount of unconventional gas predicted 
to reside in the subsurface of their property.167 Regulatory control of such 
arrangements is crucial because the agreements would qualify and control 
ownership interests and this is best achieved through the implementation of 
clear and consistent legislation. The provisions could also outline relevant 
governance mechanisms in the event of ownership disputes arising.168 
Finally, increased regulatory intervention outlining coherent and 
dependable rules for the construction of mineral deeds is critical for the 
United States. It is important to determine whether old mineral deeds, created 
in a different energy era, encompass unconventional gas interests and further, 
whether the orthodox common law principles supporting those deeds 
continue to apply.169 The introduction of a uniform definition of the term 
"minerals" is particularly attractive in this context because of its capacity to 
                                                             
166 Peter M. Gerhart & Robert D. Cheren, Recognising the Shared 
Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1041, 
1097 (2013) (where the authors note that the possibility of assigning shares to 
sharing owners has been made more feasible by the introduction of modern 
seismic technology). 
167 Id. at 1098. 
168 Gerhart & Cheren, supra note 166, at 1099 (discussing the preference 
of private agreements that are subject to judicial review to legislative 
regulation although accepting that a governance mechanism for disputes may 
be best mandated through legislation). 
169 See Kostrub & Christenson, supra note 114, at 697 (suggesting a 
need for consistency in the application of canons of construction to mineral 
deeds). 
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promote greater consistency, especially where the actual intention of the 
parties is obscure and unclear.170 Whilst different states may come to varying 
conclusions regarding how statutory principles may be introduced, defining 
the term "mineral" broadly, to include all forms of unconventional gas is 
advantageous as it would not only preclude the perpetuation of outdated and 
non-representatives common law rules of construction such as the Dunham 
rule, it would reinforce the broad and dynamic nature of mineral resources.171 
Reform proposals in Australia must also revolve around targeted 
legislative intervention. Moderating the interface between surface ownership 
and mineral exploitation through the introduction of specific codes of 
behavior is particularly important. This is best achieved through the 
consistent introduction of detailed land access codes, akin to that which has 
been introduced in Queensland.172 Whilst statutory provisions regulating the 
nature and scope of surface estate access cannot diminish the severity with 
which unconventional gas development has impacted landowners, it can at 
least ensure that the manner in which such access is conducted is efficient and 
qualified, thereby ensuring that any disruption caused is kept to an absolute 
minimum. 
                                                             
170 See Bruce M. Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Don't Mix: The 
Mangling of Common Law Property Concepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 565 
(1994) (arguing that courts regularly choose from a range of inconsistent 
canons of construction to interpret a document and this has produced vast 
differences in outcome). 
171 See, e.g., Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308–09 
(1984) (where the court concluded that a deed reservation for "other 
minerals" includes "oil and gas"). 
172 Supra note 152. A Land Access Code has been introduced in 
Queensland (Department of Employment, Economic Development and 
Innovation, Nov. 2010, Land Access Code, http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/ 
assets/land-tenure-pdf/land_access_code_nov2010.pdf) and has been 
discussed as part of a reform package in New South Wales. See Petroleum 
(Onshore) Amendment Bill 2013 (NSW), Schedule 1, §§ 69DB, DC. 
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A further possible statutory reform for Australia lies in the introduction 
of a specific regulatory framework focused exclusively on the issuance of 
unconventional gas licenses. Such a framework could be embedded within 
existing mineral and petroleum legislation and would include a broad range 
of conditional provisions allowing for the issuance of investigative and non-
determinative mining licenses, capable of being extinguished on the 
happening of specified criteria. For example, statutory provisions could 
confer upon the state the capacity to extinguish an issued shale gas license in 
the event of unforeseen environmental impact flowing from the process of 
hydrofracturing or, in the event of significant and unreasonable impacts upon 
the livelihood or industry of landowners. Such a framework would mediate 
the impact of a dominial ownership framework by imposing ongoing welfare 
assessment obligations upon the state in the issuance of extractive 
entitlements.173 
D. CONCLUSION 
Unconventional gas, and more, particularly, shale gas has been 
described as "the most significant energy innovation this century."174 The 
scale of the unconventional gas revolution has generated tensions in 
ownership frameworks across the world. The private and state ownership 
models that exist in the United States and Australia respectively have been 
slow to respond to the challenges of this expanding industry. In examining 
the fundamental principles underlying each ownership exemplar, and 
particularised common law and statutory developments, this Article argues 
that the existing property paradigms are ill equipped to deal with the demands 
                                                             
173 The possibility of introducing non-determinative mining licenses in 
New South Wales was discussed by Samantha Hepburn, A Critical 
Evaluation of the New Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas in New 
South Wales (2013) U.N.S.W. L.J (forthcoming). 
174 See Fueling North America's Energy Future: The Unconventional 
Gas Revolution and the Carbon Agenda, HIS, Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates, Executive Summary, ES-1, available at http://www2/cera/com/ 
docs/Executive_Summary.pdf. 
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of this emergent industry in the absence of targeted legislative intervention. 
Neither the private, common law, accession based framework nor the public, 
state based, dominial frameworks have been able to effectively embrace the 
convergent social, environmental and technological issues associated with 
unconventional gas development. 
Ownership frameworks must be responsive to the environment in which 
they function. There is no utility in the perpetuation of out-dated, non-
receptive principles that cannot effectively transition into a modern 
environment. The propagation of established ownership conventions is non-
sensical where they do not support, justify and explicate the landscape in 
which they operate. In both the United States and Australia, the exploitation 
of unconventional gas deposits has had a dramatic impact on communities 
and landscapes. In both countries, the ownership models support the 
severance of land and mineral ownership. Whilst the private framework for 
mineral ownership in the United States is markedly different to the state 
framework for mineral ownership in Australia, in both countries, the advent 
of unconventional gas has generated significant complications for ownership 
frameworks reliant upon the separation of land and mineral ownership. These 
issues are likely to be exacerbated without the introduction of swift, 
regulatory initiatives aimed at promoting legitimacy and transparency in the 
complicated process of balancing competing and proliferating surface and 
sub-surface ownership interests. 
